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Abstract
We present an intertemporal portfolio choice model where individuals invest in nan-
cial literacy, save, allocate their wealth between a safe and a risky asset, and receive a
pension when they retire. Financial literacy aects the excess return and the cost of stock
market participation. Since literacy depreciates over time and has a cost related to current
consumption, investors simultaneously choose how much to save, the portfolio allocation,
and the optimal investment in literacy. This last depends on households' resources, its
preference parameters and on how much nancial literacy aects the returns on risky
assets and the stock market participation cost, and the returns on social security wealth.
The model implies one should observe a positive correlation between stock market par-
ticipation (and risky asset share, conditional on participation) and nancial literacy, and
a negative correlation between the generosity of the social security system and nancial
literacy. The model also implies that the stock of nancial literacy accumulated early in
life is positively correlated with the individual's wealth and portfolio allocations later in
life. Using microeconomic cross-country data, we nd support for these predictions.
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11 Introduction
The classical theory of portfolio choice rests on the assumptions that there are no transaction
costs and that investors have full information about the risks and returns related to available
assets. If all investors face the same returns distribution and have the same information set,
dierences in attitudes to risk aect the allocation of wealth between safe and risky assets,
but not the particular asset selected. Also, if the utility function exhibits constant relative
risk aversion, asset shares are independent of wealth. Under these assumptions, the rich man's
portfolio is simply a scaled-up version of that of the poor man. However, recent empirical
studies show that household portfolios exhibit too much heterogeneity to be consistent with
the classical model. In particular, many individuals do not invest in stocks, a feature that has
come to be known as the stockholding puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995).
The literature has tried to solve the puzzle by focusing on xed entry costs. In the presence
of entry costs, investors benet from stockholding only if the expected excess return from
participation exceeds the xed cost. Since the gain increases with wealth, entry costs relate
wealth to stockholding. In particular, models with entry costs suggest that investors with wealth
below a certain threshold do not enter the stock market, and that only those whose wealth is
above this threshold do so. Empirical evidence documents a strong positive correlation between
stock market participation and nancial wealth in many industrialized countries, providing
support to models featuring entry costs (Guiso et al., 2003; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). The
exact nature of entry costs, however, is not well understood. Are these monetary costs or
information costs? Do all investors face the same entry costs, or do they vary across investors?
Are there ways that allow investors to avoid or reduce entry costs?
In this paper we focus on lack of nancial sophistication as a potential explanation for
limited nancial market participation. In the paper we posit that, like other forms of human
capital, nancial information can be accumulated, and that the decision to invest in nancial
literacy has costs and benets. Accordingly, we study the joint determination of nancial
information, saving and portfolio decisions, theoretically and empirically. In the theoretical
model we posit that people are endowed with an initial stock of nancial literacy, which they
acquire before entering the labor market, and that investing in nancial literacy gives access
to better investment opportunities, raising the returns to risky assets or lowering entry costs.
Acquiring nancial information however, entails costs in terms of time, eort and resources.
2Our model delivers conditions for optimal saving, asset allocation and investment in nancial
literacy. In particular, the model implies that nancial literacy and stockholding are positively
correlated. However, the relation between the two variables is not a causal relationship, because
both variables depend on preference parameters, household resources, and the cost of acquiring
information. We nd also that introducing a social security system (or making an existing
system more generous) reduces the incentive to save, to invest in nancial literacy, and to
invest in risky assets, other things being equal. Therefore the social security system impacts on
stockholding in two ways: directly, by reducing discretionary wealth, and indirectly by reducing
the incentive to invest in nancial literacy, thereby making stockholding less desirable.
In Section 2 we review the relevant literature, with a particular focus on studies of the
relation between nancial sophistication and stockholding and work addressing the endogeneity
of nancial literacy with respect to stockholding. Section 3 presents our theoretical model,
analyzing two distinct channels through which nancial literacy aects asset allocation, i.e.
by raising assets returns (Model I), and by lowering transaction costs (Model II). To convey
the main insights in the simplest framework, we focus on a two-period model with an isoelastic
utility function. The model also features a social security system, showing that the replacement
rate (as an indicator of the generosity of the system) aects saving, portfolio choice, and
investment in nancial literacy. The two models deliver several testable implications: (1) in
both models, the initial stock of nancial literacy aects the trajectory of literacy later in
life; (2) Model I predicts that the stockholding decision does not depend on nancial literacy,
while the share invested in risky assets increases with literacy; (3) Model II predicts a positive
relation between literacy and participation, but no relation between literacy and the share of
risky assets; (4) both models predict that social security aects portfolio choice, reducing stock
market participation and investment in risky assets; (5) the eect of social security on the
demand for risky assets depends on the initial stock of nancial literacy.
In Section 4 we present our microeconomic data derived by merging the Survey of Health,
Ageing, Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which covers a representative sample of individuals
aged 50+ in Europe, and SHARELIFE, a retrospective survey of the same individuals. We
dene indicators of nancial literacy based on a series of questions available in SHARE (for
current literacy) and SHARELIFE (for literacy early in life). The SHARE indicator is framed
in the context of simple nancial questions, and elicits the ability to understand and perform
3simple nancial operations. Mathematical competence does not necessarily span all domains
of nancial literacy, for instance the awareness of specic nancial products or tax incentives
to save. However, a minimal level of mathematical competence is needed to evaluate the
return and risk characteristics of nancial products, as suggested by the limited impact of
nancial education programs that do not explicitly address a minimal level of mathematical
literacy, (Carpena et al. 2011). Therefore, in the empirical section we will use indicators of
mathematical competence early in life available in SHARELIFE as a proxy for nancial literacy.
Our regression results for the determinants of stockholding and of the share of risky assets are
presented in Section 5 . We nd that the initial stock of nancial literacy is strongly associated
with stockholding, but not with the share of risky assets, lending support to models in which
literacy lowers transaction costs (Model II). Section 6 summarizes our results.
2 Financial sophistication and portfolio performance
Many recent empirical studies using panel data on household portfolios nd that low level of
nancial sophistication is associated with poor risk diversication, inecient portfolio alloca-
tions, and low wealth accumulation. Calvet et al. (2007) and (2009) nd substantial hetero-
geneity in account performance using Swedish data, and that part of the variability of returns
across investors is explained by nancial sophistication. In particular, they show that predic-
tors of nancial sophistication (such as wealth, income, occupation, education) are associated
with higher Sharpe ratios, and that richer and more sophisticated households invest more e-
ciently. Hackethal et al. (2012) use data on German brokerage accounts and nd that years of
experience tends to contribute to higher returns. Feng and Seasholes (2005) nd that investor
sophistication and trading experience eliminate reluctance to realize losses. 1 Campbell et
al. (2012) study investment strategies and the performance of individual investors in Indian
equities over the period 2002 to 2012.2 They study learning by relating account age (length
of time since the account was opened) and past portfolio mistakes to the performance of the
account, and nd that account performance improves signicantly with account age.
Other studies relate household portfolio decisions to direct indicators of nancial literacy as
1See also Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Zhu (2002), and Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)
2They nd substantial heterogeneity in the time-series average returns, with the 10th percentile account
under-performing by 2.6 percent per month, and the 90th percentile account over-performing by 1.23 percent
per month
4a measure of sophistication. Van Rooij et al. (2011) rely on a special module in the Dutch
DNB Household Survey. The module includes questions on the ability to perform simple
calculations and to understand compound interest, in
ation, and money illusion, and more
advanced questions on stock market functioning, characteristics of stocks, mutual funds, and
bonds, equity premiums, and the benets of diversication. The authors nd that nancial
sophistication is associated with the probability to invest in the stock market and a higher
propensity to plan for retirement.
Guiso and Jappelli (2008) use data from the 2007 Unicredit Customer Survey (UCS) and nd
that nancial literacy is strongly correlated to the degree of portfolio diversication, even when
controlling for socioeconomic characteristics and risk aversion. Banks and Oldeld (2007) look
at numerical ability and other dimensions of cognitive function, in a sample of older adults in
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and nd that numeracy levels are strongly
correlated with indicators of retirement savings and investment portfolios, understanding of
pension arrangements, and perceived nancial security. Stango and Zinman (2009) analyze
the pervasive tendency to linearize exponential functions. Using the 1977 and 1983 Surveys
of Consumer Finances, they show that exponential growth bias can explain the tendency to
underestimate an interest rate given other loan terms, and the tendency to underestimate a
future value given other investment terms. Christelis et al. (2010) study the relation between
cognitive abilities and stockholding using SHARE data, and nd that the propensity to invest
in stocks directly and indirectly (through mutual funds and retirement accounts) is strongly
associated with mathematical ability, verbal 
uency, and recall skills.
One problem with these studies is that the incentive to invest in nancial information de-
pends on household resources, because the benet of stockholding (and therefore the cost of not
investing in the stock market) depends on the amount invested, see Delevande et al. (2008) and
Willis (2009). Furthermore, since the true stock of nancial literacy is not observed by applied
researchers, empirical studies are aected by measurement error problems. The endogeneity
and measurement issues are similar to those arising in studies that estimate the returns to
schooling: any attempt to estimate the structural relation between schooling and wages must
deal with the endogeneity of the schooling decision and measurement errors in the quantity and
quality of education (Card, 2001). Some studies address these important econometric concerns
by using an instrumental variables approach, see Christiansen et al. (2008), Lusardi (2008), and
5Behrman et al. (2012). In the next section we build on the insights in these paper and provide
a theoretical framework to study the relation between nancial literacy and portfolio choice; in
successive sections we explore its empirical implications.
3 Theoretical background
We propose a model in which nancial literacy, saving, and asset allocation are jointly deter-
mined. The model builds on the idea that investors can increase the payo from their nancial
portfolios by acquiring information on the rate of return, an idea rst proposed by Arrow
(1987). The idea has been recently revived by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) and
(2010), who assume limited information processing capacity (as in Sims, 2003) and provide a
model where information serves to increase the precision of the signal an investor has about
nancial asset payos. Under specic assumptions on preferences and learning technology, the
interaction of the nancial information acquisition and nancial investment implies that the
more precise the information the investor has about a certain risky asset, the more valuable it
is to invest in that risky asset, and the more the agent invests in a given risky asset, the more
valuable nancial information becomes about that asset.
In these models it is optimal for the investor to specialize her information acquisition in one
asset only and in equilibrium ex-ante identical investors endogenously specialize in dierent
assets. Relative to this literature, our paper takes a reduced form approach in positing a direct
link between nancial literacy and portfolio returns. This allows us to investigate the life-cycle
aspects of investment in nancial literacy, and the eect of social security arrangements on the
decision to acquire nancial information. 3
We posit that people are endowed with an initial stock of nancial literacy which is acquired
before they enter the labor market, and that investing in nancial literacy gives access to better
investment opportunities, raising the expected return to saving (Model I) or reducing the cost
of participating in nancial markets (Model II).4
In each period, people can invest their wealth in a safe asset, in a risky asset and in nancial
literacy. Investment in literacy can directly raise the risk-free rate available to investors or the
3In related work, we study the asset pricing implications of nancial education, showing that investment in
nancial education does not necessarily reduce the volatility of risky assets markets (Padula and Pettinicchi,
2013).
4We build on the no uncertainty single asset model proposed by Jappelli and Padula (2013).
6mean of the return of the risky asset (e.g. through lower fees), reduce the variance of the return
of the risky asset through increased diversication, or aect the market entry cost for the risky
asset. Of course, there are several special cases, such as where the risk free rate is constant,
but the mean and variance of the risky asset are aected by nancial literacy.
The stock of nancial literacy depreciates over time, but people can acquire nancial infor-
mation, which entails costs in terms of time, eort, or resources. Accordingly, agents choose
how much to invest in nancial literacy, how much to save, and how much to invest in the risky
asset, given their initial level of literacy, the cost of literacy, the depreciation of the stock of
literacy, and their preferences. As noted by Arrow (1987), the incentive to invest in literacy
depends not only on the return to literacy (e.g. on the grounds that which raising literacy pro-
vides access to better investment opportunities and improved risk diversication) but also on
the amount of wealth available for nancial investment (the incentive is an increasing function
of wealth).
Our theoretical analysis of Models I and II proceeds in two steps. In the rst step, we
derive optimal saving, investment in risky assets, and investment in nancial literacy in each of
the two models. In the second step we study how the generosity of the social security system
- summarized in the replacement rate - aects these decisions. We nd that in the presence
of mandatory contributions people have fewer resources to invest in the market (the familiar
Feldstein displacement eect), acquire less nancial information, and have fewer incentives to
invest in stocks. The focus is to derive testable implications from the models in the simplest
framework.5
3.1 Model I: Financial literacy and asset returns
We assume that consumers live for two periods, and that they earn income y in period 0 and
retire in period 1. At the beginning of period 0 they have no assets but are endowed with a
stock of nancial literacy, 0. The initial stock of literacy is what people know about nance
before entering the labor market. This therefore depends on schooling decisions and parental
5For ease of exposition, we analyze the two models separately. Of course it is possible to study a model
in which nancial literacy aects the returns of risky assets (Model I) as well as participation costs (Model
II). The nested model has the same qualitative insights as Models I and II, although dierent quantitative
implications. For instance, in the nested model the level of 0 that triggers stock market participation is lower
compared to Model II. Since we do not calibrate and simulate the theoretical models, but use them only to
derive comparative static results, there is no real advantage in presenting the nested model.
7background, neither of which we model explicitly.
Consumers can increase their stock of nancial literacy by investing in nancial literacy
in period 0. Literacy depreciates at the rate ; the relative cost of literacy in terms of the
consumption good is p, which includes monetary and time costs incurred by consumers. The
stock of literacy therefore evolves according to:
1 = (1   )0 +  (1)
where  denotes investment in nancial literacy.
The portfolio return is paid at the beginning of period 1 on wealth transferred from period
0 to 1. Denoting by ! the share of wealth invested in the risky asset, the gross portfolio return
is:
R(1;;;!) =
(
1(1;;;!) with probability (1)
2(1;;;!) with probability 1   (1)
where 1(1;;;!) = 
1(1 + !) and 2(1;;;!) = 
1(1   !),  2 (0;1),  > 0 and
0() > 0 and 00() < 0. If ! = 0, wealth is entirely invested in the riskless asset and the gross
return is 
1. If ! = 1, wealth is entirely invested in the riskless asset and the gross return
is 
1(1 + ) with probability (1) and 
1(1   ) with probability 1   (1). Therefore, the
mean return of the risky asset is f[2(1) 1]+1g
1 and the rst and second moment of the
equity premium distribution are [2(1)   1]
1 and 2
1 , respectively. The Sharpe ratio is
thus an increasing function of nancial literacy since 0() > 0, an assumption that is motivated
by the empirical literature on portfolio performance and nancial sophistication surveyed in
Section 2.6
We assume that the utility function is isoelastic, so that consumers choose saving (s),
investment in nancial literacy () and the risky asset share (!) to maximize:

1  
1

 1 
c
1  1

0 + E0c
1  1

1

subject to c0 = y   p   s and c1 = R(1;;;!)s, where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor
and E0() is the expected value of consumption in period 1. Appendix A.1 deals with the
logarithmic case. The rst order conditions with respect to s,  and ! are:
s
1
 = c
1

0 E0R(1;;;!)
1  1
 (2)
6Notice that depending on the shape of (1) the equity premium can be negative if 0 is suciently low.
This would make it optimal not to participate in the stock market even in the absence of transaction costs. For
instance, if (1) is a normal cumulative distribution function with mean equal to , participating to the stock
market is optimal only if 0 is large enough to make the optimal 1 > .
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s
 

1
=
0(1)
h
1(1;;;!)1  1
   2(1;;;!)1  1

i
(   1)E0R(1;;;!)1  1

(3)
1(1;;;!) =
"
(1)
1   (1)
#
2(1;;;!) (4)
From (4), we obtain an expression for the share of wealth invested in the risky asset:
! =
(1)   [1   (1)]

 f(1) + [1   (1)]
g
(5)
Equation (5) has an important implication for empirical work. In a cross-section of house-
holds reporting information on nancial literacy (1) and a risky asset share (!), equation (5)
implies a positive association between the two variables. But clearly it cannot be concluded
from this correlation that a higher stock of literacy leads to a higher risky asset share, because
both variables are endogenous. In our model, equation (5) is therefore an equilibrium condition
between the optimal share and the optimal stock of literacy, not a reduced form equation. Thus
it implies that any factor that leads to higher nancial literacy will also raise investment in the
risky asset.
Using the budget constraint, (2) and (5), it can be shown that:
s =
(1;;;)
1 + (1;;;)
(y   p) (6)
where (1;;;) = (2
1) 1 f(1) + [1   (1)]g. Notice that (1;;;) =  if
 = 1.
From equations (3), (5) and (6) the optimal level of investment in literacy is implicitly
dened by:
p =
(1;;;)
1 + (1;;;)
 
1
+ (1;)

(y   p) (7)
where:
(1;) =
0(1)
   1
(
(1) 1   [1   (1)]
 1
(1) + [1   (1)]

)
The right-hand side of equation (7) is the marginal return from nancial literacy investment.
The return has two components. The rst component depends on 
1; this component is positive
and captures the eect of literacy on the expected return to saving, and is also present in the
model without uncertainty (Jappelli and Padula, 2013). The second component depends on
(1;), and is also positive, capturing the eect of literacy on the distribution of the risky
9asset return. The rst component is an increasing function of ; the second component is an
increasing function of 0(1), i.e. of how much literacy raises the risky asset return.7
Straightforward application of the Dini theorem for implicit functions implies the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 If the right-hand side of (7) is a decreasing function of 1, the optimal level
of nancial literacy is an increasing function of  (or , 0, y) and a decreasing function of p
(or ), i.e.:
@
1
@
> 0;
@
1
@
> 0;
@
1
@0
> 0;
@
1
@y
> 0;
@
1
@p
< 0;
@
1
@
< 0
In addition, Appendix B shows that lim!1 
1 > lim!0 
1 and provides sucient condi-
tions for the marginal return from nancial literacy to be a decreasing function of literacy.
Figure 1 plots the left-hand side (dashed line) and the right-hand side (continuous line) of
(7) as a function of 1. The continuous curve shifts up if  increases which implies that the
optimal level of nancial literacy increases with . An upward shift of the curve also obtains if
, 0, y increase, while the line shifts down if p or  falls.
One can solve equation (7) with respect to 1 and nd the optimal value of nancial literacy,
which in turn determines saving through (6) and the share of wealth invested in the risky assets
through (5). Given our interest in deriving testable implications for the portfolio choice, we
nd it useful to focus on the share of wealth invested in the risky asset. From equation (5) it is
easy to verify that the share is positively associated with nancial literacy, which leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the right-hand side of (7) is a decreasing function of 1, the optimal share
of risky assets is an increasing function of ;, 0, and y and a decreasing function of p and
, i.e.:
@!
@
> 0;
@!
@
> 0;
@!
@0
> 0;
@!
@y
> 0;
@!
@p
< 0;
@!
@
< 0
In addition, lim!1 ! = 1
 > lim!0 ! = 0
Proposition (2) has three implications. First, any factor leading to a high share of wealth
invested in risky assets also increases nancial literacy. For instance, patient individuals (high
7Note that the marginal return of nancial literacy increases with , , 0 and y and decreases with  and p.
In addition, if (1) = (1+e 1) 1, it can shown that: (a) (1;) is a non-monotonic function of 1, increasing
for small values for 1 and decreasing for large values; (b) lim1!1 (1;) = 0; (c) (1;) is a non-monotonic
function of , increasing for small values of  and decreasing for large values; (d) lim!1 (1;) = 1 (1);
(e) (1;0) = 0.
10) have relative high risky assets shares accompanied by relatively high levels of nancial
literacy.8 For the same reason, any variable that aects literacy also aects the risky asset
share; for instance, as we shall see below, the generosity of the social security system aects
the risky asset share. Second, in the model the initial stock of literacy, 0, aects the risky
asset share only through its eect on the current stock of literacy 
1. Therefore in a regression
framework 0 can be used as an instrument for 
1. The third implication is that in standard
models with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) the risky asset share does not depend on
wealth. Here we still have CRRA, but the share depends - through its eect on literacy - on
household resources. Therefore, the model delivers a positive correlation between the risky
asset share and wealth, contrary to the standard model.
3.1.1 Social security
We now introduce social security in the model and discuss its impact on nancial literacy and
portfolio allocations. In period 0 consumers earn income y, net of social security contributions,
in period 1 they receive benets equal to b.
The rst order conditions with respect to s, 1 and ! are:
s
1
 = c
1

0 E0
8
<
:R(1;;;!)
"
R(1;;;!) +
b
s
#  1

9
=
; (8)
p
s
 

1
=
0(1)
h
1(1;;;!) + b
s
1
i1  1
  
h
2(1;;;!) + b
s
1
i1  1


(   1)E0

R(1;;;!)
h
R(1;;;!) + b
s
i  1

 (9)
1(1;;;!) +
b
s
1
=
"
(1)
1   (1)
# "
2(1;;;!) +
b
s
1
#
(10)
From (10), the share of wealth invested in the risky asset is:
! =
(1)   [1   (1)]

 f(1) + [1   (1)]
g
 
1 +
b
s
1
!
(11)
Using the budget constraint, (8) and (11) we can show that:
s =
(1;;;)
1 + (1;;;)
"
y   p  
b
(1;;;)
1
#
(12)
The optimal level of nancial literacy is implicitly dened by:
p =
(1;;;)
1 + (1;;;)
 
1
+ (1;)
 "
y   p  
b
(1;;;)
1
#
+ (1;)
b

1
(13)
8As noted above, this does not imply any causal link between nancial literacy and risky asset share.
11Equation (13) indicates that b has two eects (positive and negative) on the marginal return
to nancial literacy. The negative eect causes the optimal level of nancial literacy to decrease
if b increases. The eect is also present in the model without uncertainty on asset returns (see
Jappelli and Padula, 2013) and is due to the osetting of social security with private wealth.
If b increases, social security wealth increases, and therefore s and 1 decrease. The positive
eect is new to the model with uncertain asset returns, and is due to b being not uncertain.
The higher is b, the more individuals invest in the risky asset, which induces these individuals
to invest more in nancial literacy. If  is large enough, the former eect prevails, and the
optimal level of nancial literacy is a decreasing function of b. 9 This results is summarized in
the following.
Proposition 3 If the right-hand side of (13) is a decreasing function of 1, for large enough
 the optimal level of nancial literacy is a decreasing function of b, i.e.:
@
1
@b
< 0
Equation (13) implies that 0 also aects the link between b and nancial literacy. Depend-
ing on the model's parameters, a higher 0 can attenuate the eect of b on 1. Dening the
right-hand side of (13) as (;;;0;1;;y;p;b), we can immediately verify the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 A higher 0 attenuates the eect of b on the optimal level of nancial literacy
if:
@(;;;0;1;;y;p;b)
@1@b
< 0
Proposition 4 implies that the sign of
@
1
@0@b is the same as the sign of
@(;;;0;1;;y;p;b)
@1@b .
Figure 2 shows that the optimal level of nancial literacy is a decreasing function of b. There
are two lines in the gure, for low and high values of 0, showing that a higher 0 attenuates
the eect of the generosity of the social security systems on nancial literacy, an implication of
the model that we will confront with empirical evidence.
9The condition is  > 1(1;;;)(1;) and therefore the value of  that makes the optimal 1 to be
a decreasing function of b depends on the values of the remaining model parameters. For instance, the condition
is satised if  = 0:99,  = 0:3, 0 = 1,  = 0:5, y = 0:9, p = 0:1, and  > 0:23. More generally, the higher is
, the higher will be the value of , which makes the optimal 1 a decreasing function of b.
123.2 Model II: Financial literacy and transaction costs
We now assume that acquiring nancial literacy reduces the transaction cost of entering the
stock market, rather than assuming that it raises the asset return (as in Model I). In particular,
we assume that:
R =
8
<
:
1 + ! with probability 
1   ! with probability 1   
where  > 1
2. Moreover, we assume that if ! > 0, the consumer incurs a transaction cost equal
to

 

1

 , with 
 > 0.
Under these assumptions the intertemporal budget constraint is
c0 +
c1
R
  p1 + p(1   )0  

 

1


1 lf! > 0g = y
where, as before, c0 and c1 denote consumption in period 0 and 1, 0 and 1 the stock of
nancial literacy in period 0 and 1,  the depreciation rate of the stock of literacy, p and y the
price of nancial literacy investment and rst-period income and 1 lfg is an indicator function.
As in Model I,  = 1   (1   )0.
Again, we assume that the utility function is isoelastic. To compute the indirect utility
from investing in the risky asset, let us assume also that ! > 0. The rst order conditions with
respect to s,  and ! are:
s
1
 = c
1

0 E0R
1 
1

p = 
 (1+
)
1
1 + ! =
 

1   
!
(1   !)
which reduce to the logarithmic case if  = 1 (see Appendix A.2). The rst order condition with
respect to s delivers the standard Euler equation for consumption. The rst order condition
with respect to  implies that:
1 =
 
1
p
! 1
1+

(14)
Notice that equation (14) is not a reduced form, because it is obtained assuming ! > 0, a
condition that holds only if the utility from investing in the risky asset is greater than that from
not investing. From the rst order condition with respect to !, the share of wealth invested in
the risky asset is:
! =
   (1   )
[ + (1   )]
(15)
13Equation (15) implies that the conditional risky assets share does not depend on nancial
literacy. Using the Euler equation for consumption, (14), (15) and the budget constraint, we
obtain:
c
I
0 =
e y
1 + e 
(16)
and:
c
I
1 = (2)
 c
I
0 
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<
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 with probability 
(1   ) with probability 1   
(17)
where e   2 1 [ + (1   )] and e y  y   p
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+ p0(1   ).
The indirect utility of investing in the risky asset (V I) is computed using (16) and (17) and
can be written as:
V
I =

1  
1

 1 
1 + e 
 1
 e y
1  1
   (1 + )

If the consumer does not invest in the risky asset, cNI
0 =
y
1+ and cNI
1 = cNI
0 . Therefore,
the indirect utility of not investing in the risky asset is:
V
NI =

1  
1

 1 h
(1 + 
)
1
 y
1  1
   (1 + )
i
(18)
The utility gain from stockholding is a monotonically increasing function of 0 since the
utility of investing in the risky asset is an increasing function of 0, while the utility of not
investing in risky assets is not aected. Therefore, we can immediately verify the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 The utility gain from investing in the risky asset, V I   V NI, is an increasing
function of 0.
Proposition 5 implies that (in a random utility setting) the probability of stock market
participation increases with 0, an important dierence between Model II and Model I. From
proposition 5 it can be shown further that the optimal level of nancial literacy is an increasing
function of 0. The argument proceeds as follows. Note that if 0 = 0, the utility of investing
in the risky asset is negative, i.e. V I < V NI when the following condition holds:
p >
"


1 + 

y

1   e 	

# 1+



: (19)
where e 	 

1+
1+e 
 1
 1
. 10 Condition (19) implies that if the price of nancial literacy
is suciently large, it is not optimal to invest in the risky asset if 0 = 0. Moreover,
10Notice that if 
 becomes zero, the right-hand-side of (19) also goes to zero, which implies that it is not
optimal to invest in the risky asset market if p > 0.
14lim0!+1 V I   V NI = +1, which, together with condition (19), implies that one can nd
a value for 0, say 0, such that ! > 0 if 0 > 0. Since it is optimal to invest in nancial
literacy only if ! > 0, this implies that 0 has to be high enough to trigger investment in
nancial literacy. The argument is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If condition (19) is satised, there exists a value for 0, 0, such that V I =
V NI, i.e.:
0 =
1
p(1   )
" 
1 + 


 e 	
!
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 +
y
e 	

e 	   1
#
Moreover, if 0  0, then ! > 0 and  > 0.
The empirical implication of proposition 6 is that if the initial level of nancial literacy
diers across individuals, 1 and 0 are positively correlated.
3.2.1 Social security
As in Section 3.1.1, we assume that income net of social security contributions is earned in
period 0 and social security benets b are paid in period 1. The budget constraint is:
c0 +
c1
R
  p1 + p(1   )0  

 

1


1 lf! > 0g = y +
b
R
and the rst order conditions with respect to s,  and ! are unaected.
The indirect utility of investing in the risky asset is:
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and that of not investing:
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By comparing V I and V NI we can show that the analog of condition (19) is:
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If condition (20) holds, we can show that for 0 equal to zero, V NI > V I, leading to the
following proposition.
15Proposition 7 If condition (20) is satised, there exists a value for 0, 0, such that V I =
V NI, i.e.:
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Moreover, if 0  0, then ! > 0 and  > 0.
There are two implications of proposition 7. First, if p is large enough, the utility gain from
investing in the risky assets becomes positive for suciently high values of 0, as in proposition
6. Second, 0 is an increasing function of b. This implies that the higher is b, the higher is
the initial level of nancial literacy that triggers stock-market participation and investment in
nancial literacy.
To appreciate the eect of the generosity of the social security system on stockholding, note
that both V I and V NI are increasing functions of b. From proposition 6, if 0 > 0 and b = 0,
V I > V NI. Furthermore, as b increases, V I approaches V NI from below. If   1, V I and V NI
diverge, but V I does so at a slower rate than V NI. If  < 1, limb!1 V I   V NI = 0 . This
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 8 There is a value for b, say b, such that V I = V NI. Moreover, if b  b, then
! = 0 and  = 0.
Proposition 8 implies that the generosity of the social security system is negatively correlated
with stock market participation and investment in nancial literacy.
3.3 Empirical implications
Section 3 shows two channels through which nancial literacy can aect portfolio choice. Model
I focuses on the eect of literacy on the distribution of asset returns, and posits that higher
(and safer) returns are associated with higher nancial literacy. By assuming that higher
nancial literacy reduces the cost of stock market participation, Model II also implies a positive
link between nancial literacy and portfolio returns. Both models predict a positive eect of
literacy earlier in life (0) on the trajectory of nancial literacy (1), but dier along important
dimensions. Model I implies that in an heterogeneous population, where people are identical
except for their initial stock of literacy, (a) everyone participates in the stock market, and (b) the
risky asset share is positively related to nancial literacy. Model II implies that (a) participation
depends on literacy, but (b) the asset share, conditional on participation, does not. Therefore,
16to compare the validity of the two models we need to study the correlation between asset shares,
participation, and nancial literacy. A positive correlation between literacy and asset shares,
and no correlation between literacy and participation, would support Model I. Alternatively, a
positive correlation between literacy and stockholding and no correlation between literacy and
the risky asset share would support Model II.
In our empirical study we verify some other important implications of the model. In par-
ticular, we focus on the role of social security in the incentives to accumulate nancial literacy,
exploiting cross-country variation in the replacement rate. In particular, we test propositions
3 and 4 for Model I and 7 and 8 for Model II including in our regressions the replacement rate
and its interaction with 0.
To make our tests operational, we estimate the linear projections of nancial literacy, asset
shares, and stock market participation on the initial level of literacy and the social security
replacement rate; the projections can be seen as linear approximations of the model's reduced
form equations. To account for the role of other potential eects on stockholding and on the
risky asset share, we control for a number of other variables, which are held constant in the
theoretical model. Denoting households by i, countries by c, and survey years by t, leads to
the following specication:
yi;c;t = dc + 1i;0 + 2i;0  c + 3xi;t + "i;t (21)
where dc is a country dummy, c is the country-level replacement rate, xi;t is the vector of
additional variables aecting portfolio choice, "i;t an error term and yi;c;t is either the current
stock of nancial literacy (i;t), stock market participation or share of wealth invested in risky
assets (!i;t). Suppose rst that yi;c;t is nancial literacy. Propositions 1 of Model I and 5
of Model II imply a positive correlation between i;tand i;0, i.e. 1 > 0. Furthermore, both
Model I and II indicate that a higher replacement rate reduces the eect of i;0 on i;t, implying
2 < 0, see proposition 4 of Model I and proposition 7 of Model II.
If yi;c;t denotes the share of risky assets, in Model I 1 > 0 and 2 < 0, since the share of risky
assets is an increasing function of nancial literacy, while in Model II 1 = 2 = 0, because it is
conditional on stock market participation, the share of wealth invested in the risky asset does
not depend on nancial literacy. When yi;c;t is the indirect utility of stockholding, the reverse
implications apply to stock market participation. Model I predicts that everyone should invest
in stocks ( 1 = 0 if the equity premium is positive). In Model II the utility of participating
17is an increasing function of 0 (1 > 0) while b attenuates the eect of 0 on the stockholding
decision (2 < 0), see propositions 7 and 8, respectively.
The list of x variables is potentially large, but three variables are prominent in our exercise.
First, the incentive to accumulate wealth and to invest in nancial literacy depends on age,
because younger individuals hold less wealth and therefore have a lower incentive to invest in
nancial literacy, see Jappelli and Padula (2013). A second important element is that nancial
literacy is likely to be correlated with education attainment. Third, households' resources
(real estate, nancial wealth and household disposable income) aect the incentives to acquire
nancial literacy, and also stock market participation and { possibly { asset shares. As we
explain in the next section, to estimate the model we use cross-country microeconomic data
with information on portfolio composition, current nancial literacy and nancial literacy early
in the life-cycle.
4 Data
We test the theoretical predictions of Models I and II using data from SHARE, a representative
sample of those aged 50+ in 11 European countries. This dataset has several advantages.
First, SHARE provides good proxies for nancial sophistication, based on responses to specic
questions that allow us to construct an indicator of nancial literacy. Second, the survey
provides data on mathematical and language skills before entry to the labor market (at school
age), providing a valuable instrument to allow joint determination of literacy, stockholding and
the asset share. Third, SHARE provides consistent and comparable information on household
portfolios (transaction accounts, bonds, stocks, mutual funds, and retirement accounts) allowing
us to measure direct stockholding, indirect stockholding through mutual funds, and respective
asset shares. Finally, the cross-country dimension of SHARE allows us to study portfolio
decisions and their interactions with nancial literacy, in countries with relatively generous
public pension systems (e.g. France and Italy) and to contrast them with data from countries
where occupational pension schemes (e.g. Netherlands) play a prominent role.
SHARE data refer to 2003 and 2006 and cover many aspects of the well-being of elderly
populations, ranging from socio-economic to physical and mental health conditions. 11 Wave 1
11We use data from SHARELIFE release 1, dated November 24th 2010 and SHARE release 2.3.1, dated July
29th 2010. SHARE data collection is funded primarily by the European Commission through the 5th Framework
Programme (Project QLK6-CT-2001- 00360 in the thematic \Quality of Life"), the 6th Framework Programme
18refers to 2003 and covers 11 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland). Wave 2 refers to 2006 and includes
these 11 countries plus the Czech Republic, Poland, and Ireland. 12 Wave 3 (which excludes
Ireland) is known as SHARELIFE, and records individual life-histories for Wave 1 and 2 re-
spondents, based on the so-called life-history calendar method of questioning, which is designed
to help respondents recall past events more accurately. The sample includes 14,631 observa-
tions obtained merging Wave 1 and SHARELIFE, and 18,332 observations merging Wave 2
and SHARELIFE. Selected sample statistics are reported in Table 1, separately for Waves 1
and 2. The variables have the same denitions in 2003 and 2006, except for income which is
gross of taxes in 2003 and net of taxes in 2006. Therefore, we report separate estimates for the
two samples.
In both wages, the average age of the household head is 64 years, the fraction of females
is just above 50 percent, and singles account for 24 percent of the sample. The fraction of
high-school and college graduates is also stable in the two waves, with high school graduates
accounting for 30 percent of the sample, and college graduates for another 20 percent. These
gures hide considerable cross-country heterogeneity. Nordic countries feature a much higher
share of college graduates than Italy, Spain and Greece. The fraction of couples ranges from 53
percent in Austria to 67 percent in Belgium. Household nancial wealth also varies consider-
ably, with Switzerland clearly the leader, followed by Sweden, while households in Italy, Spain
and Greece report much lower gross nancial assets. The ranking between Scandinavian and
Mediterranean countries is reversed for real assets, with median values of around 157,000 euro
in Belgium, 139,000 euro in Italy and 65,000 euro in Sweden.
4.1 Financial literacy
The questionnaire for Waves 1 and 2 of SHARE includes four questions referring to simple
nancial decisions, on which basis we construct a measure of nancial literacy. The rst question
(Projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT- 2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-
2006-028812) and the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and SHARE-LEAP, 227822), with ad-
ditional funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291,
P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064, IAG BSR06-11, R21 AG025169), and various national sources
(see www.share-project.org/t3/share/index.php for a full list of funding institutions). For information on sam-
pling and data collection see Klevmarken (2005).
12In Wave 2, a refresher sample is drawn for all countries except Austria and the Flemish part of Belgium.
The refresher sample includes only one age-eligible (50+) person per household.
19is aimed at understanding whether respondents know how to compute a percentage. The second
and third questions ask respondents to compute the price of a good oered at a 50 percent
discount, and the price of a second-hand car that sells at two-thirds of its cost when new. The
fourth question is about understanding interest rate compounding in a saving account, and
is commonly considered a good proxy for nancial literacy, see Lusardi and Mitchell (2008),
Lusardi et al. (2010) and Hastings et al. (2012).13
The rst three questions re
ect the ability to apply minimal amount of mathematical lit-
eracy, and the fourth is a typical question in virtually all nancial literacy assessment studies.
Following Dewey and Prince (2005) we combine the answers to the four questions into a sum-
mary indicator as a measure of the current stock of literacy it. Details on the wording of the
questions and the construction of the indicator are given in Appendix C and discussed further
in Christelis et al. (2010).
Our approach recognizes that a certain level of mathematical competence is a necessary
condition for nancial literacy; in fact, any nancial literacy assessments invariably includes
questions that require some amount of mathematical literacy. For instance, a minimum level of
competence in mathematical literacy is required to compute a percentage, to understand the
meaning of interest compounding, or to use the concept of uncertainty, and to evaluate asset
returns. Therefore, in our empirical application we are condent that our SHARE indicator of
nancial literacy is closely correlated with a broader concept of nancial literacy, such as that
provided by the OECD, which denes nancial literacy as: \Knowledge and understanding of
nancial concepts, and the skills, motivation and condence to apply such knowledge and un-
derstanding in order to make eective decisions across a range of nancial contexts, to improve
the nancial well-being of individuals and society, and to enable participation in economic life."
In the model in Section 3 i0 is the nancial literacy endowment before entering the la-
bor market. SHARE retrospective data (SHARELIFE) provide a plausible measure of this
endowment. Survey participants report their mathematical ability at age 10 in response to
the question: "How did you perform in Maths compared to other children in your class? Did
you perform much better, better, about the same, worse or much worse than the average?"
14 While mathematical does not span exactly the same domain of nancial literacy, ongoing
13The interest rate question is one of three nancial literacy questions in the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) and is used in several other international surveys.
14The survey also asked about relative performance in language, and we use this variable in our robustness
20research shows that there is a close correlation between the two concepts of literacy. Indeed,
preliminary results from the most recent PISA survey show that nancial literacy among the
young is strongly correlated with mathematical literacy, and that nancially sophisticated re-
spondents are also likely to be relatively skilled in terms of mathematical competence. 15
The indicator of current nancial literacy (it) ranges from 1 to 5, with a sample mean
of 3.43 for Wave 1 and 3.48 for Wave 2 - see Table 1. In both years the indicator exhibits
considerable sample variability, with a coecient of variation of 0.32. Our measure of initial
literacy (i0) also ranges from 1 to 5, with similar means and coecients of variation. The
correlation between it and i0 is 0.28. Our measures of it and i0 are imperfect proxies
of nancial literacy, and can therefore be seen as error- ridden measures of nancial literacy.
To the extent that measurement error is non-dierential, the measured correlation actually
underestimate the true correlation.
4.2 Stockholding and risky asset share
SHARE provides detailed information on both nancial and real assets. Financial assets include
bank and other transaction accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks, mutual funds,
individual retirement accounts, contractual savings for housing, and life insurance policies. The
questions on real assets refer to the value of the house of residence, other real estate, business
wealth and vehicles (see Christelis et al., 2010).
We adopt two denitions of stockholding: direct stockholding and total stockholding, de-
ned as stocks held directly plus stocks held through mutual funds and investment accounts
(assuming that whoever holds mutual funds and retirement accounts has some stocks in them).
Figure 3 reports participation in direct and total stockholding in the 11 countries in our sample.
The prevalence of direct stockholding ranges from less than 6 percent in Greece and Italy to 49
percent in Sweden. Total stockholding goes from about 10 percent in Austria, Spain and Italy
to 75 percent in Sweden. Broadly speaking, stockholding increases from Southern to North-
ern Europe, with a group of intermediate countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands
and Switzerland). Sweden and Denmark have by far the highest direct and total stockholdings,
while Austria, Spain, Greece and Italy are at the other end of the spectrum. The graph suggests
that country eects are potentially quite important for explaining the stockholding decisions
checks.
15The relation between mathematical and nancial literacy is discussed at length in (2013).
21of European investors. Our regression framework therefore introduces country xed eects in
each of the specications.
In contrast, Figure 4 shows that cross-country dierences in conditional asset shares (ex-
cluding households with zero stockholding) are much less pronounced. The share of wealth
held directly in stocks ranges from 20 percent in Denmark and Sweden to 35 percent in Austria
and Italy. Therefore, the relatively small number of stockholders in Italy and Greece invest
in stocks more than the average European household. Northern countries feature intermediate
values for the share of risky assets, with the notable exception of Sweden where risky assets
represent almost 40 percent of nancial wealth.
5 Empirical estimates
5.1 Financial literacy
Table 2 presents the OLS regressions for nancial literacy, separately for Waves 1 and 2. Each
regression also includes a full set of country dummies; for brevity these coecients are not
reported here.16 In the baseline specication in column 1 we nd that i0 is a strong predictor
of it. The coecient of i0 is large (0.30) and quite precisely estimated (the standard error
is 0.025). This nding is consistent not only with our model's prediction but also with other
evidence on the long-term impact of early-life conditions (see, for instance, Herd et al., 2012).
The age coecient is negative (-0.017), and shows that in this sample of aged individuals, the
stock of literacy falls by about 0.5 percent per year, suggesting that households incentives to
invest in nancial literacy decline with age, when wealth also tends to fall.
The coecient of the female dummy is also negative. That women have lower nancial
literacy than men which is in line with the results from other studies (see Lusardi and Mitchell,
2008). Our model also predicts a negative eect because women generally have less wealth
than men and therefore fewer incentives to invest in nancial literacy. Education is strongly
correlated with literacy (a coecient of 0.40 for high-school and 0.59 for college graduates).
The positive correlation is also consistent with our model, because higher human capital and
lifetime income are associated with a higher stock of nancial literacy. The negative signs of
16Country dummies provide a partial but important control for the cost of nancial literacy. But the cost
of nancial literacy can also vary between households within the same country. Therefore, we assume that the
residual household level variation in the cost of literacy is orthogonal to our chosen set of controls.
22the coecient of the dummy for singles and family size is likely to depend on the fact that
these variables are negatively correlated with wealth. The coecient of the interaction term
between the replacement rate and i0 is negative, indicating that more generous social security
systems attenuate the eect of i0 on later nancial literacy, as predicted by Models I and II.17
The regression implies that a 1 percent increase in the replacement rate reduces the eect
of i0 on it by about 0.16 percent. Figure 6 shows how the eect of i0 on it varies across
countries, depending on the replacement rate. The eect is relatively large for countries such
as the Netherlands (a 1 standard deviation increase in 0 leads to an increase in it of 0.23)
and Switzerland (0.22), and is relatively small for Italy (0.17) and Spain (0.14), which have
relatively high replacement rates.
In column 2 of Table 2 we add health status and log disposable income to rule out that
the eect of i0 on it is simply due to the correlation between i0 and these variables. The
coecients of health status and log income are positive and statistically dierent from zero,
while the other coecients (and of i0 in particular) are not aected. In the next regression
(column 3) we check the stability of the coecients replacing the age variable with a full set
of age dummies. The pattern of the estimated coecients of the age dummies (not reported
for brevity) indicates that the stock of nancial literacy falls during retirement, while the
coecients of the other variables are unaected. Of course, in cross-sectional data we cannot
distinguish between age and cohort eects, and therefore an interpretation of the age dummies
in terms of cohort eects (literacy improves for younger generations) would be equally possible.
The other three regressions in Table 2 repeat the estimation using data from Wave 2. The size
and signicance of the coecients is very similar to Wave 1. In particular, the coecient of i0
ranges between 0.27 to 0.29 and is precisely estimated, while that of the interaction between
i0 and c is negative, conrming the model's prediction that a more generous social security
system attenuates the eect of i0. 18
17The replacement rate is drawn from Disney (2004).
180 is not the only early childhood variables that can aect later nancial literacy. In a related paper,
Jappelli and Padula (2013) add to the nancial literacy regression a number of other controls for early life
resources in the house, family cultural background and health conditions. These augmented regressions conrm
a positive and sizable eect of 0 on later nancial literacy.
235.2 Stockholding
Next, in order to distinguish between our two alternative models of how nancial literacy aects
portfolio choice (through the returns or the transaction cost channel), we investigate the deter-
minants of the decision to invest in stocks (or other risky assets). In order to distinguish the
determinants of nancial market participation, we study separately direct and total stockhold-
ing, which also includes stocks owned through managed investment accounts and mutual funds.
We use the same specication as for nancial literacy, relating stock market participation to
demographic variables, education, indicators of household resources, and most important for
the present study, the initial stock of literacy i0.
The results for direct and total stockholding are reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
In each of the tables columns 1 to 3 refer to Wave 1, and columns 4 to 6 to Wave 2. The
results show that both direct and total stockholding fall with age, a result found in several
other studies (see, for instance, Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004). The results are similar for direct
and total stockholding and for the two waves of SHARE, and imply that one year is associated
with a reduction in stockholding of between 0.1 and 0.2 percent.19
Introducing age as a linear variable does not aect any of our results, as shown in Tables 3
and 4 columns 3 and 6 where a set of age dummies replaces the linear age term. The coecient
of the female dummy is negative but imprecisely estimated, possibly because nancial literacy
captures part of the gender gap in stockholding, as argued in a recent paper by Alemberg and
Dreber (2011).
Singles are 10 percent less likely to invest in stocks than couples (the omitted category). But,
being single is correlated with household resources. In fact, controlling for income and wealth
reduces the eect by a factor of roughly 3. High-school and college graduates are, respectively
4.6 and 15 percent more likely than high school drop-outs to hold stocks directly. The coecient
of initial literacy (i0) is positive and statistically dierent from zero. Columns 1 and 4 in
Table 3 show that an increase of one standard deviation in i0 is associated with an increase in
stockholding of 7 percentage points, and the result is quite stable across specications. Results
for total stockholding (Table 4) are similar, with a slightly smaller eect on i0 (about 5.5
points). These results are consistent with the prediction of Model II, that nancial literacy
19Note again that in our context we cannot distinguish between a genuine age eect and a cohort eect where
younger cohorts are more likely to invest in stocks.
24triggers participation by reducing entry costs.
Finally, we interact i0 with the replacement rate (c) to check whether the generosity of
the social security system aects the incentive to acquire nancial information. Note that the
replacement rate varies only across countries and therefore the direct eect of c is absorbed by
the country dummies, which are included in all regressions. The coecient of the interaction
term is negative (2 < 0), meaning that a higher replacement rate attenuates the eect of i0
on stockholding, consistent again with Model II. The eect is similar across specications and
denitions of stockholding (direct or total), meaning that a 1 percent increase in the replacement
rate reduces the eect of i0 on stock-ownership by about 0.06 percentage points.
Figure 5 shows how the eect of i0 on direct stockownership varies with the replacement
rate. The eect is a decreasing function of the replacement rate, i.e., countries with relatively
low replacement rates show stronger eects. For instance, in the Netherlands and in Switzerland
a one standard deviation increase in i0 increases participation by 4 percentage points, while
in Italy the increase is only 1.6 points.
5.3 Risky asset share
The nal set of results are for the regressions for asset share invested in stocks. In this case
again we use two denitions of stockholding (direct and total). Model I shows that nancial
literacy might aect not only stock market participation but also the share of risky assets,
allowing people to invest in assets with higher returns. As a result, people with higher nancial
literacy might also invest more in risky assets. We estimate a Tobit model for the nancial
asset share invested in stocks and nd no eect of nancial literacy on the risky asset share (at
conventional signicance levels), regardless of how share is dened (direct stockholding as in
Table 5, or total stockholding as in Table 6). In conjunction with the evidence on stock market
participation, the results lend support to models (such as Model II) where literacy aects the
decision to own stocks but not the asset share invested.
Note that, compared to stock market participation, asset shares are more volatile and more
dicult to predict. Most of the estimated coecients, while reasonably signed, are not precisely
estimated, with the notable exception of the high-school and college dummies, which suggests
a positive relation between education and the share of risky assets.
According to standard portfolio theory, the main determinant of the share of risky assets is
25the coecient of relative risk aversion (the lower the risk aversion, the higher the share). In the
special case of CRRA the share is independent of wealth. Our results reveal a positive relation
between household resources and asset shares, suggesting that exposure to stock market risk
tends to be higher for the wealthy. The dummy for singles has a negative and statistically
signicant coecient, which is somewhat reduced if we control for household resources (income
and wealth). Better health status is also positively associated with a higher share of risky
assets, consistent with the argument that people exposed to background risks (such as health)
tend to limit exposure to risks that can be avoided.
The regressions in Tables 5 and 6 indicate also that the eect of i0 is positive, but
rather small and not precisely estimated. We therefore use i0 as the identifying variable
in a selectivity-model of the asset share, assuming that i0 aects the participation decision
but not the asset share. The main advantage of a selectivity model is that we can focus on
the conditional asset share, i.e. restrict attention to the sample of actual stockholders. The
model also allows us to distinguish between the extensive and intensive margins (respectively
the decision Mills ratio to invest in stocks and the amount invested). The respective results for
direct and indirect stockholding are reported in Tables 7 and 8.
The selectivity model conrms many of the results of the Tobit regressions, in particular
that household resources aect conditional asset shares not just the participation decision. The
age eect is positive and statistically dierent from zero. Aging by 1 year is associated with a
0.3-0.5 percentage points increase in the share of wealth invested in directly held stocks (0.6%
for total stockholding). However, the pattern of the age dummies coecients, not reported here,
rejects the hypothesis of a linear age eect in favor of a hump-shaped prole. The coecients of
the other variables are less precisely estimated than in the Tobit model. The selectivity model
is also consistent with non-random selection since, in most specications, the coecient of the
inverse Mills ratio is statistically dierent from zero for both direct and total stockholding.
6 Conclusions
Identifying the channels through which nancial literacy aects household saving behavior is a
challenge for empirical research. Previous ndings of a positive correlation between measures of
nancial literacy and portfolio outcomes do not necessarily mean that nancial literacy improves
portfolio diversication, or that it causes higher stockholding and higher saving. Therefore
26previous evidence is not sucient grounds for policies aimed at raising levels of nancial literacy
among the general population, or some target groups. To understand the causal nexus between
nancial literacy and portfolio choice it is necessary to identify the explicit channel through
which literacy aects portfolio decisions, and to explicitly address the endogeneity of literacy
with respect to portfolio choice. In this paper we focused on lack of nancial sophistication as a
potential explanation for limited nancial market participation. We posit that, like other forms
of human capital, nancial information can be accumulated, and that the decision to invest
in nancial literacy has costs and benets. Accordingly, we studied the joint determination
of nancial information, saving, and portfolio decisions, both theoretically and empirically.
We assumed that nancial literacy is costly to acquire but allows individuals to access better
nancial investment opportunities. In particular, we proposed two channels through which
nancial literacy might aect saving behavior, by raising the returns on risky assets and by
reducing the transaction costs to enter the stock market.
We tested some of the implications of the model using household data drawn from the
Survey of Health, Ageing, Retirement in Europe (SHARE). We found that the link between -
nancial literacy and portfolio choice is likely due to the fact that nancial sophistication reduces
participation costs. The empirical results show also that the level of nancial sophistication
before individuals enter the labor market aects nancial literacy throughout life. Therefore
policies aimed at improving the level of nancial education early in the life-cycle are likely to
have long-run consequences on portfolio allocations.
We also exploited the cross-country dimension of our data to test an important implication
of our model, namely the role of social security in shaping the decision to accumulate nancial
literacy. The results indicate that more generous social security systems reduce the incentives
to accumulate wealth and invest in stocks, attenuating the eect of initial literacy on the
stockholding decision, which is consistent with the model's prediction.
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31Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev N
Wave 1
Age 63.577 9.272 14,631
Female 0.545 0.498 14,631
Single 0.242 0.428 14,631
Family size 2.204 0.985 14,631
Log income 10.571 1.384 14,555
Log wealth 12.141 1.726 14,631
High school 0.298 0.457 14,631
College 0.202 0.402 14,631
Health status 3.159 1.015 14,631
Replacement rate 0.742 0.221 14,631
t 3.426 1.087 14,631
0 3.296 0.895 14,631
Wave 2
Age 64.335 9.514 18,332
Female 0.542 0.498 18,332
Single 0.235 0.424 18,332
Family size 2.182 0.953 18,332
Log income 10.474 1.406 18,141
Log wealth 12.423 1.705 18,332
High school 0.318 0.466 18,332
College 0.212 0.409 18,332
Health status 3.060 1.054 18,332
Replacement rate 0.731 0.224 18,332
t 3.481 1.107 18,332
0 3.297 0.898 18,332
Note: The table reports sample statistics for selected variables in SHARE Wave 1 (top panel) and Wave 2
(bottom panel). In Wave 1 income is gross of taxes, in Wave 2 it is net of taxes. Wave 1 refers to 2003 and
Wave 2 to 2006.
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39Figure 1: Marginal return and cost of investing in nancial literacy
-
6
1
p

1
MR
Note: The stock of nancial literacy is on the horizontal, marginal return (MR) and cost (p) are on the
vertical axis; 
1 is the optimal level of nancial literacy investment at which the marginal return equals the
marginal cost.
Figure 2: Optimal stock of nancial literacy and replacement rate
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Replacement rate
Low 0
High 0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

Note: The replacement rate is on the horizontal, the optimal level of nancial literacy on the vertical axis.
The model's parameters are set as follows:  = 0:3,  = 0:99,  = 0:3,  = 0:5, y = 0:7, p = 0:1. The
continuous line is obtained setting 0 to 1, the bulleted to 2.
40Figure 3: Stock-ownership, by country
Note: The country means are computed on our working sample, obtained by merging SHARE Wave 1 and
Wave 2 with SHARE life. Total stockholding is dened as direct ownership of stocks and ownership through
mutual funds.
Figure 4: Asset shares, by country
Note: The country means are computed on our working sample, obtained by merging SHARE Wave 1 and
Wave 2 with SHARE life. Total stockholding is dened as direct ownership of stocks and ownership through
mutual funds.
41Figure 5: Marginal eect of 0 on direct participation as function of the replacement rate
Note: The gure shows how the marginal eect of initial literacy on direct participation varies with the
replacement rate. The marginal eect is constructed using the estimates reported in the rst column of
Table 3.
Figure 6: Marginal eect of 0 on t as function of the replacement rate
Note: The gure shows how the marginal eect of initial on current nancial literacy varies with the
replacement rate. The marginal eect is constructed using the estimates reported in the rst column of
Table 2.
42Appendix A Logarithmic Utility
Appendix A.1 Model I: : Financial literacy and asset returns
In this appendix we assume that consumers choose saving (s), investment in nancial literacy
() and ! to maximize:
lnc0 + E0 lnc1
subject to c0 = y  p s and c1 = R(1;;;!)s, where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor and
E0() is the expected value given what is known in period 0. The rst order conditions with
respect to s,  and ! are, respectively:
s = c0 (22)
p
s
=

1
+ 
0(1)ln
 
1 + !
1   !
!
(23)
1 + ! =
"
(1)
1   (1)
#
(1   !) (24)
From (24), the share of wealth invested in the risky asset is:
! =
(1)   [1   (1)]
 f(1) + [1   (1)]g
=
2(1)   1

(25)
To give further insights on the solution, note that Equation (25) can also be written as the
risk-free return multiplied by the ratio of the rst to the second moments of the excess return
distribution:
! = 

1
[2(1)   1]
1
22
1
(26)
When the risk-free rate is constant and the distribution of the excess return does not depend
on nancial literacy, equation (26) reduces to the standard portfolio rule, which states that the
optimal share of risky assets is proportional to the risk-adjusted excess return.
Using the rst-period budget constraint and (22), one can show that:
s =

1 + 
(y   p) (27)
Equation (27) is not a reduced form, but an equilibrium condition, implying that investment
43in nancial literacy and rst-period saving are negatively correlated.
Equations (23) and (27) can be used to show that the optimal level of nancial literacy
investment is implicitly dened by:
p =

1 + 
(

1
+ 
0(1)ln
"
(1)
1   (1)
#)
(y   p) (28)
The left-hand side of (28) does not depend on 1. Instead, 1 aects the right-hand side of
(28) in three ways. If 1 increases the ratio 
1 decreases, 0(1) decreases due to the concavity
of (1), while the odds-ratio, i.e. the ratio between (1) and 1 (1) increases. The overall
eect of an increase of 1 on the right-hand side of (28) is therefore negative if the following
condition applies:
 

2
1
+ 
00(1)ln
"
(1)
1   (1)
#
+
[0(1)]2
(1)[1   (1)]
 0 (29)
Equation (29) is satised for large enough values of  if (1) = (1+e 1) 1 (see Appendix B
for details).
Using the Dini theorem for implicit functions, one can show that the optimal stock of
nancial literacy, 
1, is an increasing function of  (or , y, 0) and a decreasing function of
p (or ) if equation (29) is satised. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 If condition (29) holds, the optimal level of nancial literacy is an increasing
function of  (or , y, 0) and a decreasing function of p (or ), i.e.:
@
1
@
> 0;
@
1
@
> 0;
@
1
@y
> 0;
@
1
@0
> 0;
@
1
@p
< 0;
@
1
@
< 0
Equation (28) can be solved with respect to 1 to nd the optimal value of nancial literacy,
which in turn determines saving through (27) and the share of wealth invested in the risky assets
through (26). From equation (25) it is easy to verify that the risky asset share share is positively
associated with nancial literacy, which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 10 If condition (29) holds, the optimal share of wealth invested in the risky asset
is an increasing function of , , 0, and y and a decreasing function of p and , i.e.:
@!
@
> 0;
@!
@
> 0;
@!
@0
> 0;
@!
@y
> 0;
@!
@p
< 0;
@!
@
< 0
Proposition 10 leads to the same set of empirical implications as proposition 2.
44Appendix A.2 Model II: Financial literacy and transaction costs
We compute the indirect utility when ! > 0 and compare it with the indirect utility when
! = 0. If ! > 0, the rst order conditions with respect to s,  and ! are:
s = c0
p = 
 (1+
)
1
1 + ! =
"

1   
#
(1   !)
The rst order condition with respect to ! implies that the share of assets is:
! =
2   1

(30)
Equation (30) implies that the risky asset share does not depend on nancial literacy. The
rst order condition with respect to  implies that:
1 =
 
1
p
! 1
1+

(31)
From the budget constraint and the rst order conditions with respect to s and , one
obtains consumption at time 0:
c
I
0 =
e y
1 + 
(32)
where e y  y p


1+


1 + 1



+p0(1 ). Equation (32) denes the optimal level of consumption
at time 0 if ! > 0. To compute the indirect utility of investing in the risky assets, we compute
optimal consumption in period 1 using the rst order condition with respect to s and !:
c
I
1 =
2
 + 1
c
I
0 
8
<
:
 with probability 
1 with probability 1   
(33)
Plugging (32) and (33) in the utility function, we obtain the indirect utility function of
investing in the risky asset:
V I = (1 + )ln e y
1+ +  ln +  [ln2 +  ln + (1   )ln(1   )] (34)
45Notice that if  > 1
2 the term in square bracket is positive.
If the consumer does not invest in the risky asset, the return on saving is 1, and it is easy
to verify that c0 =
y
1+ and cNI
1 = cNI
0 . The indirect utility of not investing in the risky asset
is thus:
V
NI = (1 + )ln
y
1 + 
+  ln (35)
The model implies that those who do not participate in the stock market have no incentives
to invest in nancial literacy. If V I < V NI, it is not optimal to participate in the stock market.
This happens if 0 is equal to zero and the following condition on the price of nancial literacy
holds:
p >
"


1 + 

y

1   e 	

# 1+



(36)
where e 	  e
 

1+[ln2+ ln+(1 )ln(1 )].20 The indirect utility of investing in the risky asset
increases with 0, while that of not investing is not aected. Therefore, propositions 5 and 6
also hold in the logarithmic utility case.
Appendix B Comparative statics
Appendix B.1 The RHS of (28) is a decreasing function of 1
We show here under what conditions the right-hand side of the equation:
p =

1 + 
(

1
+ 
0(1)ln
"
(1)
1   (1)
#)
(y   p) (37)
is a decreasing function of nancial literacy.
Assuming that (1) = (1 + e 1) 1 and dierentiating the right hand side of (37) with
respect to 1 gives:
 

1 + 
("

2
1
+
e 1
(1 + e 1)
2
 
1   e 1
1 + e 11   1
!#
(y   p) + p
"

1
+
e 1
(1 + e 1)
21
#)
(38)
Since the second term in square brackets is positive for 1 > 0, a sucient condition for (38)
20e 	 < 1 since  > 1=2.
46to be negative is that: "

2
1
+
e 1
(1 + e 1)
2
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is also positive.
Figure A-1 plots the locus where (39) is equal to zero in the (1;) plane.21 Above the
locus, the function (39) takes positive values, below negative. The gure shows that the locus
has a maximum at about 1 = 0:996, where  is 0:1058. Therefore,  > 0:1058 is a sucient
condition for (39) being positive and (38) a decreasing function of 1.
Appendix B.2 The RHS of (7) is a decreasing function of 1
We now turn to the isoelastic case and show under which conditions the right hand side of the
equation:
p =
(1;;;)
1 + (1;;;)
 
1
+ (1;)

(y   p) (40)
is a decreasing function of 1.
The last term, y   p, decreases if 1 increases, and the rst term,
(1;;;)
1+(1;;;) decreases if
1 increases provided that (1) = (1 + e 1) 1 and  < 1. Therefore, if the second term:

1
+ (1;) (41)
is decreasing, the right hand side of (7) is also decreasing function of 1.
Assuming that (1) = (1 + e 1) 1 and dierentiating (41) with respect to 1 gives:
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Therefore if:
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(43)
is positive, (41) is a decreasing function of 1.
21Since (39) diverges to +1 for 1 going to zero and converges to 0+ for 1 going to innity, the gure
focuses strictly larger than zero but small values for 1.
47It is immediate to verify that:
lim
!0
"
2e ( 1)1(1 + e 1)2
(1   )(1 + e 1)
2  

1   
#
= 0
Therefore, for small  (43) converges to 
2
1 and (7) is a decreasing function of 1. For larger
, (43) can be positive or negative.
Figure A-2 plots the loci where (43) is equal to zero in the (1;) plane, for various values
of . Above each the curves, the function (43) takes positive values, below it takes negative
values. The gure shows that the maximum in curve for  = 1 lies above the maxima for the
other curves (and in fact for any other value of  smaller than 1). Therefore,  > 0:1058 is also
a sucient condition for (43) being positive and (41) a decreasing function of 1.
Appendix B.3 lim!1 
1 > lim!0 
1
This section provides the conditions under which the optimal level of nancial literacy obtained
as  goes to innity is larger than the the optimal level of nancial literacy obtained as  goes
to zero.
Recall that the optimal level of nancial literacy is implicitly dened by:
p =
(1;;;)
1 + (1;;;)
 
1
+ (1;)

(y   p) (44)
Assume that (1) = (1+e 1) 1. For  equal to zero, the right-hand side of (44) reduces to:

 
1
1 + 
1 
1
(y   p) (45)
To evaluate the limit of the right-hand side of (44) for  going to innity, notice that:
lim
!1(1;) = 1   (1)
Moreover:
lim
!1
(1;;;)
1 + (1;;;)
=
8
<
:
0 if lim!1 (1;;;) = 0
1 if lim!1 (1;;;) = 1
For 1 to be implicitly dened by (44), it must happen that (1;;;) diverges if  goes to
48innity. The limit of (1;;;) for  going to innity is:
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;) = (2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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if [0(1   )] > 1. Therefore:
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This shows that if [0(1   )] > 1, (46) lies above (45) since:
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1
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
>

 
1
1 + 
1 
1
and the optimal level of nancial literacy is larger when  goes to innity than when  is equal
to zero.
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Note: The curve is the locus of all points in the plane (1;) where (39) is equal to zero. For the points
below the curve, (39) is negative, for the points above (39) is positive.
49Figure A-2: 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Note: The curve is the locus of all points in the plane (1;) where (43) is equal to zero, for various values
of . For the points below the curves, (43) is negative, for the points above (43) is positive.
Appendix C SHARE Data
Appendix C.1 Wealth data in SHARE
Wealth is the sum of real and nancial assets and is imputed when one or more items are
missing. The questions on nancial assets are about whether the respondent owns the asset
and, if yes, in what amount. If the respondent declines to answer about the amount or claims
not to know, she is referred to an unfolding brackets sequence that includes three threshold
values which dier by country and asset item. The respondent is randomly assigned to one of
the three thresholds and is asked whether she owns more or less than that threshold. Depending
on the answer, the next question refers to the next higher or lower threshold, and so on. The
thresholds impose barriers on the range of acceptable values for each asset, which are taken
into account during the imputation process.
The imputation procedure involves the construction of a system of equations that include
economic and demographic variables, and where each variable is imputed sequentially through
many iterations, conditional on the values of the other variables in the system from the same
or previous iterations (for a fuller description of the process see Christelis, 2008). This chained
imputation procedure is analogous to the one implemented in the US Survey of Consumer
50Finances, see Kennickel (1991).22 All values are adjusted for dierences in the purchasing
power of money across countries using OECD purchasing power parity data.
Appendix C.2 Financial literacy in SHARE
The questions used to construct the nancial literacy indicator are set out below. Possible
answers are shown on cards displayed by the interviewer who is instructed not to read them
out to respondents:
1. If the chance of getting a disease is 10 per cent, how many people out of 1,000 can be
expected to get the disease? The possible answers are 100, 10, 90, 900 and another answer.
2. In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale a sofa costs 300 euro.
How much will it cost in the sale? The possible answers are 150, 600 and another answer.
3. A second hand car dealer is selling a car for 6,000 euro. This is two-thirds of what it
costs new. How much did the car cost new? The possible answers are 9,000, 4,000, 8,000,
12,000, 18,000 and another answer.
4. Let's say you have 2,000 euro in a savings account. The account earns 10 per cent interest
each year. How much would you have in the account at the end of the second year? The
possible answers are 2,420, 2,020, 2,040, 2,100, 2,200, 2,400.
If a person answers (1) correctly she is then asked (3) and if she answers correctly again she
is asked (4). Answering (1) correctly results in a score of 3, answering (3) correctly but not (4)
results in a score of 4 while answering (4) correctly results in a score of 5. On the other hand if
she answers (1) incorrectly she is directed to (2). If she answers (2) correctly she gets a score
of 2 while if she answers (2) incorrectly she gets a score of 1.
Appendix C.3 Mathematical ability in SHARELIFE
SHARELIFE has a module on childhood that asks about living conditions, accommodation,
and family structure. Additionally, the module asks questions about mathematical ability at
22The variables are imputed by regressing them on the full set of demographic and economic variables that
are part of the SHARE imputation process, and generate ve alternative imputed values for each missing
observation, in order to match the ve implicate datasets in SHARE.
5110 years of age. The exact wording of the question is: \Now I would like you to think back to
your time in school when you were 10 years old. How did you perform in Maths compared to
other children in your class? Did you perform much better, better, about the same, worse or
much worse than the average? "
The module asks a similar question about language skills: \And how did you perform in
[country's Language] compared to other children in your class? Did you perform much better,
better, about the same, worse or much worse than the average?
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